ZeroNet Signed-Update Propagation Simulator

ZeroNet sites have no central server — files are hosted and relayed peer-to-peer, BitTorrent-style, by anyone who happens to have them. What keeps that model trustworthy is cryptography, not the identity of the peers: a site's address is derived from its owner's public key, every published content.json manifest is signed with the matching private key, and each peer independently re-verifies that signature before accepting or relaying an update. This simulator renders a live P2P swarm in 3D — publish a genuine signed update and watch it gossip across the network with verification succeeding at every hop, or launch an attacker's tampered update and watch honest peers reject and refuse to relay it because they lack the private key needed to forge a valid signature. A "compromised plugin" toggle demonstrates the real failure mode: skipping verification lets tampered content spread exactly like a real update, which is why ZeroNet's actual attack surface includes plugin trust and multi-user content, not just the core signature scheme.