Compensating Wage Differentials: The Price of a Dangerous Job
Raise a job's undesirability and see the wage premium a competitive labor market must offer to fill it: each simulated worker has a personal willingness-to-accept threshold, and only a high enough premium pulls in enough of them.
This simulator shows why equally skilled jobs pay differently once working conditions diverge. Two employers need the same skill, but one job is safe and pleasant while the other carries a chosen level of danger or discomfort. At an identical wage, workers overwhelmingly prefer the pleasant job, so the employer offering the unpleasant one must add a wage premium — a compensating differential — to attract willing applicants. Each simulated worker has a private threshold for how much extra pay would make the risk worth it; raising the offered premium pulls in progressively more of them, even the most risk-averse. Raising the job's undesirability level pushes every worker's threshold higher, so the premium required to fill all the open positions rises with it — a direct, adjustable demonstration of how the size of a compensating differential tracks the severity of the underlying condition and the collective risk tolerance of the labor pool.
Raise a job's undesirability level and watch a pool of 120 workers, each with a personal willingness-to-accept threshold, decide whether to apply: as the offered wage premium rises, progressively more workers accept, and a live readout shows the exact premium needed to fill all open positions — rising with how dangerous or unpleasant the job becomes.
3D · Three.js / WebGL renderer · 60 FPS target · runs fully client-side, no install