Home▸Cybersecurity▸BGP Prefix Hijack: RPKI Origin Validation Adoption and Hijack Reach

BGP Prefix Hijack: RPKI Origin Validation Adoption and Hijack Reach

Watch a rogue network announce someone else's address block and see how far the lie spreads. Sixty autonomous systems on a small-world ring learn the victim's /23, then a hijacker announces a more specific /24, an exact-prefix copy or a forged-origin route. Choose how many ASes run RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), whether the victim published a tight, loose or no ROA, and whether big ASes or random ones deploy first, and read the captured share, the routing table of a sample AS and the longest-prefix-match decision. Blender-built routers, rack, shields and attacker dish, with independent numerical checks. A synthetic educational model, not Internet measurements.

Cybersecurity3DAdvanced60 FPS📱 Mobile-adapted🟠 Blender⇄ 2D version
BGP Prefix Hijack: RPKI Origin Validation Adoption and Hijack Reach ↗ Open standalone

Watch a rogue network announce someone else's address block and see how far the lie spreads. Sixty autonomous systems on a small-world ring learn the victim's /23, then a hijacker announces a more specific /24, an exact-prefix copy or a forged-origin route. Choose how many ASes run RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), whether the victim published a tight, loose or no ROA, and whether big ASes or random ones deploy first, and read the captured share, the routing table of a sample AS and the longest-prefix-match decision. Blender-built routers, rack, shields and attacker dish, with independent numerical checks. A synthetic educational model, not Internet measurements.

⚙ Under the hood

Watch a rogue network announce someone else's address block and see how far the lie spreads. Sixty autonomous systems on a small-world ring learn the victim's /23, then a hijacker announces a more specific /24, an exact-prefix copy or a forged-origin route. Choose how many ASes run RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), whether the victim published a tight, loose or no ROA, and whether big ASes or random ones deploy first, and read the captured share, the routing table of a sample AS and the longest-prefix-match decision. Blender-built routers, rack, shields and attacker dish, with independent numerical checks. A synthetic educational model, not Internet measurements.

BGPRPKIRoute HijackingNetwork SecurityRoutingRoute Origin ValidationPrefix HijackLongest Prefix Match

3D · Three.js / WebGL renderer · 60 FPS target · runs fully client-side, no install

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