Three abstract options A, B, C and a hall of voters. How often does majority rule go round in circles?
Exact P(cycle)-
Sampled P(cycle)-
Elections held0
Latest outcome-
Plurality winner differs from Condorcet-
Borda winner differs from Condorcet-
Limit n to infinity (IC)8.774%
Check n=3 by hand: 12/2165.556%
The science
Setting. Each voter has a strict ranking of three options A, B, C (six possible rankings). Option X beats Y when more than half the voters rank X above Y. For odd n there are no ties. If A beats B, B beats C and C beats A the majority relation is a Condorcet cycle (Condorcet's paradox, 1785): majority rule has no stable winner although every voter is perfectly consistent.
Exact probability. If a random voter has ranking j with probability pj, the number of voters of each type follows a multinomial law. The app enumerates every composition k=(k1..k6) with sum n, weights it by n!/∏kj! ∏pjkj, tests the three pairwise majorities, and sums the weight of cyclic profiles. Single-peaked preferences contain no cycle at all (Black, 1948).
Known values (impartial culture). n=3: 12 cyclic profiles out of 63=216, i.e. 1/18=5.556%. As n grows the probability rises towards 1/4 - (3/(2π)) arcsin(1/3) = 8.774% (Guilbaud 1952; Gehrlein).
Checks shown. (1) Exact enumeration at n=3, 5, 7 vs a separate brute-force over all 6n ballots. (2) n=3 equals 1/18. (3) The sampled frequency of random elections vs the exact value (z-score). (4) The n to infinity limit is the closed form above.
Voting rules compared. Plurality counts first places; Borda gives 2/1/0 points for 1st/2nd/3rd place; the Condorcet winner beats both others head-to-head. The readouts count how often the first two disagree with the Condorcet winner when one exists.
Honest limits. A, B, C are abstract options with no real parties, people or places. Real electorates are far from impartial culture and cycles are empirically rarer than the model predicts; ballots are assumed sincere, with no strategic voting, abstention or ties. This is a mathematical illustration, not advice about any real voting system.