Corporate law: who really controls the vote?

Live readouts

Experiment

Press "Run experiment".

Independent numerical check


The science

Voting power is not share ownership. With a threshold rule, what matters is how often a holder is pivotal. Shapley-Shubik: over all orderings in which holders join a winning coalition, the fraction in which a holder turns it from losing to winning. Banzhaf: share of swings (winning coalitions that lose when the holder leaves).

Dual-class shares multiply the votes of holder A per share, so vote share and capital share diverge (control with a small stake).

Cumulative voting for directors. Each share gets n votes (one per seat) that may all go to a few candidates. To guarantee d of n seats against any opposing split a minority needs more than dS/(n+1) shares, i.e. floor(dS/(n+1))+1 (S = total shares). Verified by brute-force ranked elections, ties going to the majority.

Simplifications. Educational general-principles model, not legal advice: jurisdictions differ (quorum, supermajority, class votes, proxies, fiduciary rules). Five holders, no abstention.