WPA2 vs WPA3 SAE: Offline Cracking vs Online-Only Guessing

Left tower: WPA2 router with a GPU rig guessing offline. Right tower: WPA3 router with a padlock and a laptop throttled by lockouts. The gold plate is the real passphrase rank. Drag to orbit.

Switch to 2D
Controls

Presets

Parameters

Quality

Camera

Model checks

The science

Why WPA2 can be attacked offline. In WPA2-Personal the pairwise master key is PMK = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1(passphrase, SSID, 4096, 256 bit). Anyone who records one 4-way handshake can test a candidate passphrase on their own hardware: derive the PMK, recompute the handshake check, compare. No contact with the access point is needed, so the only limit is hardware speed G (guesses per second). Each guess costs 4096 × 2 HMAC-SHA1 calls, which is why PBKDF2 slows attackers down but does not stop a GPU farm.

Why WPA3 changes the game. WPA3-Personal replaces the handshake with SAE (Dragonfly), a password-authenticated key exchange. A recorded exchange does not let an observer test guesses; every guess needs a live protocol run with the access point, which can rate-limit and lock out. With g attempts per second, k failures allowed before a lockout of tl seconds, the long-run rate is r = k / (k/g + tl).

People are not random. An attacker tries likely passphrases first. Modelling choices as a Zipf list, P(rank r) ∝ r-s over N candidates, the chance of success after M guesses is H(M,s)/H(N,s) with H(M,s) = ∑r≤M r-s (the sum is evaluated by Euler-Maclaurin for large M). With strong skew a short, predictable passphrase falls to a few thousand guesses, however big the list is; a truly random passphrase of the same list size needs about N/2 guesses.

Simplifications. One hash rate for the whole attack; the list order is known to the attacker; no dictionary-plus-rules mutations; WPA3 side-channel flaws (Dragonblood) and transition-mode downgrade to WPA2 are not modelled (they weaken real deployments, so treat WPA3 results as the ideal protocol); an offline attacker can also capture a handshake only when a client joins. Defensive explanation only, no tooling. Checks: the real IEEE 802.11i PBKDF2 test vector computed by an in-page SHA-1, Euler-Maclaurin sums against direct summation, the quantile sampler against the formula, and an event simulation of the lockout.

Loading model...
Loading Blender model...
-
-
Made with 🟠 Blender · Three.js