Government and critical-infrastructure systems classify every document into an ordered set of levels and every user into a matching clearance. The Bell-LaPadula model (1973, still the formal basis of most government MLS/MAC systems) enforces confidentiality with two rules, given subject clearance L(s) and object classification L(o):
Simple Security Property (ss-property), "no read up":
read(s, o) allowed ⇔ L(s) ≥ L(o)
Star Property (*-property), "no write down":
write(s, o) allowed ⇔ L(s) ≤ L(o)
Levels: 0 UNCLASSIFIED < 1 CONFIDENTIAL < 2 SECRET < 3 TOP SECRET
Reading is blocked upward so a low-clearance subject can never see high-classification data. Writing is blocked downward so a high-clearance subject can never leak sensitive content into a lower-classification document (deliberately or via malware) — together the two rules make information flow only "flow up or stay level," never down.
- Clearance slider — sets the subject's clearance level (the sphere's shelf in the 3D lattice).
- Target level slider — picks which classification tier's document the request targets.
- READ / WRITE — selects which property is being tested, then Send Request fires an animated request pulse: green means the lattice allowed it, red means it was blocked, and the verdict box names the exact rule.
- Automated stream — generates random subject/target/action requests at the chosen rate, the same way a SOC's policy-enforcement point evaluates a continuous flow of access attempts against the classification lattice.
Real systems layer more on top of this core (compartments/need-to-know via the Chinese Wall or lattice-of-labels model, audit trails, SIEM correlation of denied attempts) but the read/write inequality above is the mechanism every one of them ultimately checks.