A Certificate Transparency (CT) log is an append-only Merkle hash tree. Every issued TLS certificate becomes a leaf; the log periodically hashes leaves in pairs, up to a single 32-byte Merkle root, and publishes a Signed Tree Head. Any client can request a compact audit proof that a specific certificate is included, without downloading the whole log:
root = H(H(H(L0,L1), H(L2,L3)), …)
proof length ≈ log2(N) for N leaves
tampering any leaf changes every hash above it → root mismatch
This simulation logs one certificate every 1 / issuance-rate seconds into a 16-leaf window. When the window fills, the tree above it is sealed (flashes gold) and a fresh window starts — exactly like a real log rolling over a batch of entries.
- Forged / mis-issued rate — the chance a newly logged certificate was never requested by the domain owner (a compromised CA, a stolen intermediate key, or a fraudulently issued cert).
- CT Monitoring — domain owners and browsers run monitors that continuously diff the public log against their own inventory of certs they actually requested. A scan (the pulse ring) catches every still-undetected forged leaf and flips it gold.
- Mean time-to-detect — the average gap between a forged certificate being logged and a monitor catching it; it falls as the scan interval shrinks, and stays "—" forever with monitoring off, which is the whole point: an unmonitored log gives an attacker unlimited time on a mis-issued cert.
Real deployments: Google's Certificate Transparency, RFC 6962; Chrome and Safari refuse to trust a publicly-issued certificate that isn't logged this way.